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TSD’s poisons and the Church Committee’s assassination-plot record: Lumumba, Castro, and a pen on 22 November 1963

According to the Church Committee’s 1975 interim report on alleged assassination plots, CIA technical services supplied pills, a contaminated diving suit and a hypodermic pen. The Committee found no evidence such biological material was ever in fact used against a person.

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AI-generated illustration: a 1960s ball-point pen on a closed manila folder beside a page of solid redaction bars and a blank calendar grid.
AI-generated image. A 1960s ball-point pen on a closed manila folder beside a page of solid redaction bars and a blank calendar grid. RealTeaNews (AI-generated illustration)

The same CIA technical service that researched covert chemical and biological tools also, according to the Church Committee’s 1975 interim report on alleged assassination plots, supplied poisons, pills, a rigged diving suit, and a hypodermic pen for plots against foreign leaders. One meeting to offer a poison pen to a Cuban agent, the Committee reported, took place on the day President Kennedy was killed.

These are Committee findings about plots and devices. They are not proof that any foreign leader was killed by these means. In Book I, the Committee separately found no evidence that biological materials developed in the CIA–Army Special Operations Division relationship “were ever in fact used against a person by the CIA.”

“At least eight” plots involving Castro

The interim report found “concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965.” “One plot, involving the use of underworld figures, reportedly twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and dispatching teams to commit the deed.” “The proposed assassination devices ran the gamut from high-powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which strain the imagination.”

Underworld figures named in the report include John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana. There was consultation, the Committee wrote, “concerning the most effective method of poisoning Castro.” “There is some evidence that Giancana or Rosselli originated the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro’s drink to give the ‘asset’ a chance to escape.” The Support Chief recalled Rosselli’s request for something “nice and clean, without getting into any kind of out and out ambushing,” preferably a poison that would disappear without a trace. The Inspector General’s report cited the Support Chief as stating that the Agency had first considered a “gangland-style killing”; Giancana reportedly opposed that idea.

Four pills in April 1962

“A notation made during this time in the files of the Technical Services Division indicates that four poison pills were given to the Support Chief on April 18, 1962.” The pills were passed to William Harvey, who arrived in Miami on 21 April, and he gave them to Rosselli, explaining that “these would work anywhere and at any time with anything.”

The notation describes a transfer of pills, not their use against Castro.

A seashell, a diving suit, and a disagreement in the record

In early 1963, Task Force W explored two further plans, according to the interim report. Desmond Fitzgerald asked whether “an exotic seashell, rigged to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro commonly went skin diving.” “The idea was explored by the Technical Services Division and discarded as impractical.”

A second plan was to have James Donovan present Castro with a contaminated diving suit. “The Technical Services Division bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus.” The Inspector General’s report stated the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative; Helms testified that “the diving suit never left the laboratory.”

Both versions are in the Committee record; this article settles neither.

The poison pen, 22 November 1963

On 22 November 1963, the Committee reports, Fitzgerald and a case officer met with the Cuban asset AM/LASH “and offered him the poison pen, recommending that he use Blackleaf-40, a deadly poison which is commercially available.” The device was “a ball-point pen rigged with a hypodermic needle … designed to be so fine that the victim would not notice its insertion.”

The Inspector General’s report noted that “it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent … and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro.” AM/LASH “did not ‘think much of the device.’”

The date is in the official reports; this record does not connect the meeting to the assassination in Dallas.

Lumumba, Leopoldville, 26 September 1960

In the Congo plot, the interim report states: “On September 26, Joseph Scheider, under assignment from CIA Headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville, provided the Station Officer with poisons, conveyed Headquarters’ instruction to assassinate Lumumba, and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for this mission.”

Richard Bissell testified it was “literally inconceivable” that Scheider would have acted beyond his instructions, and said that assuming he had instructed Scheider to carry poison to the Congo, “there was no possibility” he would have issued such an instruction without authorization from Allen Dulles.

That is Bissell’s testimony and the Committee’s narrative of Scheider’s arrival — not a finding, in the facts used here, that Lumumba was killed with those poisons.

Book I, in the chemical-and-biological chapter, notes that biological materials developed in the CIA–SOD relationship were considered for use “by CIA agents in attempted assassinations of foreign leaders,” but “the Committee found no evidence that such material was ever in fact used against a person by the CIA.”

Sources

  • Church Committee, Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (1975), PDF pp. 74, 78, 82–83, 91, 95–97, 99–100. File: 01_Church_Committee_Interim_Report_Alleged_Assassination_Plots_1975.pdf.
  • Church Committee, Final Report, Book I (1976), PDF p. 362 (cross-referenced from printed p. 388). File: 02_Church_Committee_Final_Report_Book_I_Foreign_and_Military_Intelligence_1976.pdf.

Sources

  1. Church Committee, *Interim Report*, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders* (1975), PDF pp. 74, 78, 82–83, 91, 95–97, 99–100. File: `01_Church_Committee_Interim_Report_Alleged_Assassination_Plots_1975.pdf`., U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Accessed 12 November 2026.
  2. Church Committee, *Final Report*, Book I (1976), PDF p. 362 (cross-referenced from printed p. 388). File: `02_Church_Committee_Final_Report_Book_I_Foreign_and_Military_Intelligence_1976.pdf`., U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Accessed 12 November 2026.

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