
MKULTRA Was No Rogue Side Project. Allen Dulles Gave It the Go-Ahead — and Waived the Usual Contracts and Audits
A 1963 CIA Inspector General file shows that Project MKULTRA was proposed by Richard Helms in April 1953, given the go-ahead by the Director of Central Intelligence, and set up so that ordinary contracting and regular audit procedures would not be followed.
Published

Project MKULTRA did not begin as an unofficial experiment run out of sight of CIA leadership. According to documents preserved in the CIA Inspector General’s 1963 Report of Inspection of MKULTRA, the programme was proposed at the top of the clandestine service, given the go-ahead by Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles, and deliberately placed outside the Agency’s ordinary contracting and audit rules.
On 3 April 1953, Richard Helms, then Acting Deputy Director (Plans), sent the Director a memorandum titled “Two Extremely Sensitive Research Programs.” The memorandum proposed that about 6 percent of the Technical Services Staff’s research-and-development budget, in two highly sensitive fields that could not be handled through customary contracts, be administered under special procedures. The Church Committee later summarised the same origin in its 1976 final report, Book I, stating that MKULTRA “began with a proposal from the Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, to the DCI,” and “was approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953 along the lines proposed by ADDP Helms.”
The project description attached to Helms’s memorandum, headed “PROJECT MKULTRA — Extremely Sensitive Research and Development Programs,” placed that request against a budget already given the go-ahead at a higher level. It said the Project Review Committee had given the TSS research programme the go-ahead for fiscal year 1953 on 6 June 1952. About 94 percent of that work, the description said, could be handled by regular contracts. About 6 percent was “ultra-sensitive” and should not associate the CIA or the Government with the work.
Field (a) of that ultra-sensitive work, as set out in the same attachment, was the covert use of biological and chemical materials. The research was directed toward a reversible, non-toxic “aberrant mental state” that could be reasonably well predicted for each individual and might aid in discrediting people, eliciting information, implanting suggestion, and other forms of mental control. A second field, labelled field (b) in the project description, is fully redacted in the released copy of the Inspector General’s file. Its content therefore cannot be stated from the official record set examined here.
The proposal asked the Director to let TSS handle that 6 percent of the already authorised fiscal year 1953 research budget without formal contracts, under the name Project MKULTRA. Invoice certifications would be made by the TSS Research Director, the Executive Secretary of the Research Board, and the cognizant TSS Division Chief. The attachment was explicit about the books: “regular audit procedures will not be followed.”
Dulles agreed. A Director’s memorandum dated, by stamp, 13 April 1953, signed Allen W. Dulles and addressed to the Deputy Director (Administration), authorised TSS obligation and expenditure of 6 percent of the already authorised fiscal year 1953 research budget as Project MKULTRA without the usual contracts. The memorandum stated that “No further documents will be required to justify payment,” and that regular audit procedure would not be followed.
The special procedures did not stop at the Director’s signature. A file memorandum dated 21 April 1953 recorded how subprojects were to be documented once MKULTRA was under way. Each MKULTRA subproject would have a separate file. In extreme cases a contractor need not sign, but a verbal agreement was still to be documented. Finance paperwork sent to the Comptroller would give a subproject number and a dollar amount, with no technical details.
Taken together, the Inspector General file and the Church Committee’s later summary show a programme that was authorised in writing by the Director of Central Intelligence, funded from a research budget the Project Review Committee had already given the go-ahead, and then deliberately shielded from the contracting, justification, and audit practices that governed ordinary Agency work. Technical Services Staff, later the Technical Services Division, was given a closed channel in which a small share of the research budget — about 6 percent — could be spent on work the Agency did not want associated with the CIA or the Government.
The official record of this origin does not depend on later recollection. The 1963 Inspector General file still contains the Helms memorandum of 3 April 1953, the attached project description, Dulles’s approval of 13 April, and the 21 April file memorandum on subproject paperwork. The Church Committee, writing more than twenty years after those events, traced the same chain of proposal and approval. What the released file does not disclose is the content of the fully redacted second field of work. What it does disclose is the bureaucratic fact at the centre of the record: MKULTRA was authorised at the top, and the usual rules were set aside by design.
Sources
- CIA Inspector General, Report of Inspection of MKULTRA, 26 July 1963 (C06767515): Helms memorandum, T.S. 87624, PDF p.30; Project MKULTRA description (Tab A), PDF pp.32–36; Dulles approval memorandum, PDF pp.38–39; 21 April 1953 file memorandum, PDF pp.40–42.
- Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), Final Report, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp.389–390.
Sources
- CIA Inspector General, Report of Inspection of MKULTRA, 26 July 1963 (C06767515): Helms memorandum, T.S. 87624, PDF p.30; Project MKULTRA description (Tab A), PDF pp.32–36; Dulles approval memorandum, PDF pp.38–39; 21 April 1953 file memorandum, PDF pp.40–42., Central Intelligence Agency (Internet Archive mirror of FOIA release C06767515). Accessed 12 November 2026.
- Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), Final Report, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp.389–390., U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Accessed 12 November 2026.
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